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Did the Japanese Patient Follow the Doctor’s 
Orders? Mostly no!  
A Public Choice Analysis of Greenhouse Gas Emissions 





The Great Tōhoku-Earthquake and the following nuclear meltdown in Fukushima called the 
world’s attention to Japans’ energy and climate policy. Japan is one of the biggest emitters of 
greenhouses gases in the world and still far away from reaching its Kyoto target. Emissions 
trading systems have been used in Japanese climate policy since 2005. However, experiences 
have been disillusioning: Major emission reductions have not been achieved, and a function-
ing market does not exist. Hence, we ask what the political reasons for the failure of carbon 
markets in Japan are and how they can be overcome. We use Public Choice arguments, but 
also analyze actual climate policy making in Japan on a case study basis. Thus, on the one 
hand, we identify the political obstacles of implementing ambitious greenhouse gas emissions 
trading systems in Japan, and, on the other hand, we evaluate Public Choice’s arguments and 
environmental policy making. 
JEL-Code: D620, D720, D730, Q480, Q540, Q580. 
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“One of the dangers with ivory tower theorizing is that it is easy to 
lose sight of the actual set of problems which need to be solved, 
and the range of solutions. ... [T]his loss of sight has become in-
creasingly evident in the theoretical structure underlying environ-
mental economics, which often emphasize elegance at the expense 
of realism. ... [B]oth normative and positive theorizing could great-
ly benefit from a careful examination of the results of recent inno-
vative approaches to environmental management” (Hahn 1998: 95). 
1 Introduction 
In 1989 Hahn (1989) posed the question „How the Patient Followed the Doctor’s Orders” 
referring to early experiences with emissions trading in the USA. He concluded that “virtually 
none of the systems ... exhibits the purity of the instruments which are the subject of theoreti-
cal inquiry”, “all … systems ... place great importance on the status quo”, and “distributional 
concerns play an important role in the acceptability” (Hahn 1989: 97, 109).The same insights 
can be obtained from environmental policies and greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes 
in Japan, where carbon markets have been used since 2005, but results are modest. 
Figure 1: Greenhouse gas emissions in Japan 1990-2007 
 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































While Japan’s energy efficiency is still among the highest in the world, the rate of improve-
ment has significantly slowed down since 1990 (IEA 2009: 40ff). Japan is responsible for 
4.3% of global greenhouse emissions. Total emissions in 2007
4 were 1,374 Million Tons of 
carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2eq), 9% above 1990 levels (MoE 2009a: Ch. 2). 
After intense and successful efforts to increase energy efficiency in the aftermath of the oil 
price shocks of the 1970s due to cost reasons, Japan’s specific national climate policy already 
started in 1990 and is today based on the Kyoto Protocol Target Achievement Plan imple-
mented in 2005 and revised in 2008 (GoJ 2008).
5 At the third Conference of the Parties (COP 
3) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Kyoto in 
1997, Japan, successfully taking a mediator position between the ambitious EU and the reluc-
tant USA positions, committed to emission reductions of 6% by 2008/2012 based on 1990 
levels. In addition, at the climate summit in Copenhagen, Japan committed to a 25% reduction 
by 2020 and intends to reduce its emissions by 60-80% by 2050 with 1990 as base year (GoJ 
2010: 38). The Kyoto Protocol target is divided into greenhouse gas emission reduction from 
forest sinks (3.8%), the use of project-based Kyoto mechanisms (1.6%), and domestic reduc-
tions (the residual). Altogether, comparing 2007 emissions and the Kyoto target, Japan is 
about 15% short of its commitment.  
On the policy instrument level, Japan’s Kyoto Protocol Target Achievement Plan focuses on 
voluntary action. In 1997, Japanese industry adopted the Voluntary Action Plan, today com-
prising 35 industry groups and 80% auf greenhouse gas emissions from industry and utilities 
(Wakabayashi/Sugiyama 2007). The overall target was fixed to stabilizing greenhouse gas 
emissions at 1990 levels by 2010. However, besides absolute volume targets, intensity targets 
are allowed and the project-based Kyoto mechanisms can be used in order to compensate 
greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, even the 0.5% overall reduction of greenhouse gases be-
tween 1990 and 2006 are in fact not due to domestic absolute volume reduction efforts by 
Japanese companies. Market-based instruments, on the other hand, are only mentioned in the 
Kyoto Protocol Target Achievement Plan of further research. Carbon taxes, thus, have politi-
cally failed several times since 2004; however from 2011 onwards, the now ruling Democrat-
ic Party of Japan (DPJ) intends to use low-level carbon taxes. Carbon markets have been used 
in Japan since 2005, following a global trend of applying this particular instrument. 
                                                           
4 Using 2007 emission levels is reasonable, because the 2008 financial crisis and the economic downturn has led 
to unusually low levels of emissions in the subsequent years, which presumably will increase again once the 
crisis is overcome. 
5 See also Schröder (2003) and Watanabe (2011). 4 
 
Emissions trading  schemes  as a tool for coping with environmental problems have  been 
spreading globally, especially since the new millennium (OECD 2002, 2004). While envi-
ronmental economists had been emphasizing the merits of this approach since the invention of 
tradable permit systems by Crocker (1966) and Dales (1968a, b),
6 it took until the 1990s to 
implement major emission markets in the USA, which turned out to be highly successful 
(Ellerman et al. 2000).
7 In climate politics, emissions trading was not used before the Kyoto 
Protocol of 1997 allowed the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation 
(JI), and International Emissions Trading (IET). Since then, greenhouse gas emissions trading 
schemes have been evolving rapidly across the globe including supranational system in the 
EU, national approaches in New Zealand, and even regional and local systems in the north-
eastern states of the USA and the city of Tokyo.; in addition to the implemented schemes, 
many countries are seriously considering their use.
8 
Experiences with carbon markets are mixed so far, the EU Emissions Trading Scheme being 
the most vivid example (Ellerman et al. 2010): While the initial trading period (2005-2007) 
can be considered an economic and environmental failure due to over-allocation and highly 
bureaucratic initial allocation schemes,
9 the second (2008-2012) and the third (2013-2020) 
trading periods promise major advances towards efficiency and effectiveness due to a more 
stringent, gradually decreasing EU-wide cap as well as a steadily increasing share of auction-
ing administered on the EU instead of the member state level. Altogether, carbon markets 
appear to become the most important policy instrument in global climate policy, and they are 
capable of being both economically efficient and environmentally effective. 
Japan – a leader in environmental policy and technology development in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Weidner 1992)  –  has been  using  carbon markets since 2005. Experiences, however, are 
mixed: Emission reductions have been negligible, and the creation of an efficient carbon mar-
ket has failed. Thus, in this paper we try to answer the following three questions: 
(1) What are the major design flaws of the Japanese carbon markets? 
(2) What are the political reasons behind the failure of Japanese carbon markets? 
(3) How can the flaws be overcome against the specific political background? 
                                                           
6 See also Tietenberg (2006). 
7 Early experiences with flexible command-and-control policies had been gathered in the USA already since the 
1970s (Hahn/Hester 1989). 
8 See also http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm,  http://www.climatechange.govt.nz/emissions-
trading-scheme/,  http://www.rggi.org/home; http://www.kankyo.metro.tokyo.jp/en/climate/cap_and_trade.html, 
http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/, http://www.climatechange.gov.au, http://www.pointcarbon.com/news/ 
asia/, http://www.midwesternaccord.org/index.html, , http://www.pewclimate.org/federal/congress 
9 Most of these deficiencies can be explained by using the Public Choice approach (Rudolph 2005) 5 
 
While political science and even sociology literature has analyzed environmental policy mak-
ing in Japan in general and some of the authors have even focused on climate policy,
10 there 
is a gap of knowledge on policy instrument choice in Japanese climate policy with respect to 
market-based instruments. This is true not only for the literature in western languages, but 
also for Japanese sources, because a tradition of policy feasibility and implementation re-
search does not exist in Japan. In addition, to date, an individualistic actor-based approach 
such as Public Choice has not been applied to the specific case of climate policy instrument 
choice in Japan. Thus, in order to answer the questions of this paper, we apply environmental 
economics as well as Public Choice within a case study design.
11 
In chapter 2 we describe and analyze Japan’s carbon markets based on environmental eco-
nomics’ criteria. In chapter 3 we use Public Choice arguments to explain the political failure 
of carbon markets by analyzing the most important actors, like voters, interest groups, bu-
reaucracy, and government. Also in chapter 3, we confront Public Choice predictions with the 
behavior of climate policy actors in Japan. Chapter 4 sums up and derives recommendations 
for improving the chances of implementing ambitious carbon markets in Japan. 
2 Design and Effects of Japanese Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Schemes 
The effectiveness of emission trading schemes can be analyzed by using two well-established 
environmental economics criteria:  economic efficiency  and environmental effectiveness.
12 
Using these two criteria, we now describe the design of Japanese carbon markets, evaluate 
them and identify the design elements responsible for inefficiencies and ineffectiveness. 
2.1 Design 
In 2005, Japan’s environmental ministry started the experimental Japan Voluntary Emission 
Trading Scheme (JVETS)
13 in order to motivate companies not taking part in the Voluntary 
Action Plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions efficiently. Participation, however, is volun-
tary. Until 2009, subsidies of around 3 Billion Yen in total were used annually as incentives 
for company participation. Companies could use the subsidies for financing up to one third of 
                                                           
10 See for general studies on Japanese environmental politics Schreurs (20029, Imura/Schreurs (2005), Broadbent 
(1999); and for climate policy studies Schröder (2003), Watanabe (2011). 
11 See for general environmental economics arguments e.g. Endres (2010) and Tietenberg (2011), for Public 
Choice Mueller (2003), and for the use of case studies Yin (2009) and Nutzinger/Rudolph (2011). 
12 More concrete, economic efficiency can be differentiated into company-level, overall efficiency, cost attribu-
tion, administrative and market transaction costs, property rights etc., while environmental effectiveness can be 
operationalized by the concepts of accuracy in reaching the target, innovation incentives etc (Endres 2010). 
13 See for the JVETS design e.g. MoE (2008a, b), MoE (2009c, d), MoE 2010a. 6 
 
their abatement measures. JVETS only includes CO2 emissions from fossil fuel burning. Tar-
gets are fixed bottom-up by companies, but these targets have to be in absolute volume terms. 
The target for the first year must be 1% lower than average emissions of the past three years; 
and in the subsequent years the target has to be tightened by one percentage point. Japanese 
Emission Allowances (JEA) are handed out free-of-charge, allowing for the emission of one 
ton of CO2 in any given year per allowance. The amount of allowances given to any individu-
al company is determined by each company’s individual target. Using grandfathering, compa-
nies receive allowances based on their base year emissions lessened by the promised emission 
reductions. Borrowing of allowances from future reductions is not permitted, while banking 
early reductions is unlimited. Besides Japanese Emissions Allowances, Emission Reduction 
Units (ERU) from Joint Implementation as well as Certified Emission Reductions (CER) from 
the Clean Development Mechanism can be used for compliance, although they should be 
complementary to domestic action. Trading is carried out via the Trade Matching System, 
which is supposed to lower transaction costs. Market interventions do not apply. Trading 
phases last 2½ years and start in April, the first month of the Japanese fiscal year. Monitoring 
follows Kyoto Protocol guidelines and is based on ISO 14064 and 14065.  
Supplemental to JVETS, in 2008, the Integrated Domestic Market of Emissions Trading 
(IDMET)
14 was established by the Japanese Cabinet. Major targets are to achieve significant 
emission reductions, to include all major emitters, and to integrate different types of allow-
ances from national and international schemes. Coverage is similar to JVETS; however, be-
sides individual companies, entire industry sectors can participate as single units. While sub-
sidies are not available, different options for bottom-up target setting and initial allowance 
allocations are provided. Participants can pick absolute volume as well as specific intensity 
targets
15; and they can choose the Kyoto period of 2008-2012 or parts of this period as com-
pliance terms. Nevertheless, participants’ targets must at least be as stringent as their Volun-
tary Action Plan goal, or, if lower, must equal actual emission levels. Companies without 
Voluntary Action Plan participation have to follow JVETS’ rules. In addition to picking the 
target, participants can choose between several options of free-of-charge initial allocation 
schemes. In the case of intensity targets, participants receive allowances as emission reduction 
credits ex post based on the intensity target and actual emissions, each multiplied by the actu-
al output. Participants with absolute volume targets, on the other hand, can receive allowances 
either ex ante or ex post. If they choose the ex ante option, they receive allowances according 
                                                           
14 See for IDMET design issues e.g. IDMET-Secretariat (2008), MoE (2009b, 2010a). 
15 Absolute volume targets are based on tons of CO2eq, intensity targets are e.g. given in CO2eq per output unit. 7 
 
to their target, but they have to keep 90% of the allowances in their hold until the final settle-
ment. In the ex post allocation case, at the end of the compliance period participants receive 
allowances as credits for reductions beyond the target. In contrast to JVETS, not only banking 
but also borrowing is unlimited. In addition, project-based Kyoto mechanisms can be used 
without limits. Compliance periods and the trading system follow JVETS’ rules. While gener-
ally allowances can be traded freely, only a certain amount of allowances is transferable: In 
the ex post initial allocation case, only surplus credits can be traded, and in the ex ante case, 
only 10% of the assigned allowances can be transferred.  
2.2 Effects 
Experiences with Japan’s Voluntary Emission Trading System (JVETS) are ambivalent.
16 
Companies’ individual targets were all reached in every compliance period between 2006 and 
2008. Total reductions of participants accounted for 29% below base-year levels, thus even 
exceeding commitments. Nevertheless, compared to Japan’s Kyoto commitment, reductions 
were negligible. Total reductions of JVETS participants summed up to only 0.03% of total 
Japanese greenhouse gas emissions in 1990 This is mainly because major emitters such as 
utilities and energy intensive industries did not participate. An efficient carbon market could 
not be established. The maximum participation was 86 companies, and total transactions ac-
counted for a maximum of 51 transactions and a maximum trading volume of 82,624 allow-
ances per year. The share of allowances traded has even decreased from 8 to 2% since the 
start of the program. The average price for allowances was 1,200 Yen. As the initial allocation 
was free-of-charge, only abatement costs were born by emitters, but not total emission costs. 
Hence, on the one hand, emitters did not suffer an additional burden, but, on the other hand, 
only the weak form of the Polluter-Pays-Principle was implemented. While supposedly ad-
ministrative costs were high due to the complicated initial allocation, transactions costs on the 
secondary market were low due to a working market infrastructure. Incentives to innovate 
were not effective, due to voluntary participation and low allowances prices. 
Even less convincing is the Integrated Domestic Market of Emission Trading System (ID-
MET).
17 While participation significantly increased to 700 companies in 2009 and even nine 
power companies and more than 100 energy intensive companies accepted targets, only one 
transfer of exactly one ton of CO2 occurred. In addition, the steel and car industry participated 
on a sector basis, thus impeding an efficient allocation of abatement measure within these 
                                                           
16 See for data an the experiences MoE (2008a, b), MoE (2009c, d), and MoE (2010a). 
17 See for data on IDMET MoE (2009b, 2010a) and Kawamura 2010. 8 
 
sectors. Hence, an efficient carbon market and a clear price signal could not develop. Again, 
the free-of-charge initial allocation scheme prevented heavy burdens on industry, but it only 
followed the weak form of the Polluter-Pays-Principle. Different initial allocation options for 
companies to choose from must have increased administrative costs, while again transaction 
costs should be low. In ecological terms, IDMET is a failure. While coverage increased to 
50% of Japanese CO2 emissions, of the 75 participants accepting targets in 2008, only 30 
picked absolute volume targets, while 45 – including utilities – chose intensity targets. The 
targets, though, are stringent according to the economics ministry METI (2010: 8). Hence, 
many important emitters such as utilities and the paper industry failed to reach their targets, 
thus even overcompensating reductions achieved by other participants. As a consequence, in 
2008, total emissions exceeded the total target level by more than 83 Mio. t. of CO2. The in-
tensive use of borrowing and project-based Kyoto mechanisms however protected industries 
from non-compliance. Also, in 2008, only 25 of 75 participants accepted external verification, 
so that industry data is far from being reliable. 
Altogether, both Japanese greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes (GHG ETS) have not 
been able to establish an ecologically effective and economically efficient carbon market. 
While the major greenhouse gas is covered in both programs, allowing for a acceptable com-
promise between minimizing abatement cost and keeping administrative costs low, emitter 
coverage is small due to voluntary participation and almost arbitrary partially intensity-based 
bottom-up target setting. This not only weakens the environmental effectiveness but also hin-
ders the establishment of an efficient carbon market. It can be expected that only emitters with 
low abatement costs participate, which, in addition, only set business-as-usual targets. This in 
turn leads to a lack of scarcity on the carbon market, distorted price signals and inadequate 
incentives to innovate. Also, this approach prevents reaching absolute emission reductions 
otherwise implemented by a top-down total volume cap. Using free initial allocation schemes 
delays  the  price signal and increases administrative costs. While banking is a reasonable 
measure to minimize abatement costs over time without detrimental environmental effects, 
borrowing may increase emissions and wrongfully lower the allowance price, if surplus re-
ductions are not realized in the future. Unlimited use of project-based Kyoto mechanisms in-
creases domestic emissions, and may even not lower global emission levels if projects are 
unreliable. Also, the domestic price level may be deteriorated and incentives to innovate m 
reduced. While monitoring appears effective in both programs, penalties are not sufficient, 
thus leading to incentives for non-compliance. 9 
 
Summing up, while the establishment of the trading and monitoring infrastructure can be con-
sidered a success, neither JVETS nor IDMET have successfully implemented efficient and 
effective carbon markets. Major flaws are the non-binding participation, the bottom-up setting 
of reduction targets, intensity-based targets, the generous acceptance of borrowing and pro-
ject-based Kyoto mechanisms, and the lack of severe penalties in case of non-compliance. 
In the following chapter we now try to explain the reasons of the deficiencies in Japanese car-
bon markets by using the Public choice approach to environmental policy, but also to give a 
general explanation why effective ecological policy using incentive orientated instruments is 
so difficult to implement in representative democracies. Directly following each theoretical 
analysis we look into the specific political actor’s behavior in Japan. 
3 The Political Economy of Emissions Trading: Theory and the Japanese practice 
We now turn to the economic analysis of the most important actors and discuss the motives or 
interests in environmental policy of voters, politicians, public administrations, producers and 
other interest groups
18. Figure 3.1 shows the interdependence of all of these actors and that in 
any policy process the outcome of negotiations is one of all parties’ competing interests. In 
environmental policy, being a policy that ought to preserve the common public good “the en-
vironment”, these interactions are of great importance, as our analysis will show. 
The main focus of the Public Choice analysis is discussing the different incentives of all ac-
tors in general and the use of market-based instruments. But not only is the choice of the in-
strument of great importance for successful environmental policy, also the general positions 
of the actors matter.  
In relation to climate change mitigation, Llewellyn (2010) discusses seven different intellec-
tual positions of opponents of a stronger environmental policy: Firstly, he argues, that there is 
a group of people who generally sees no need for any emission reduction policy and, secondly, 
some believe that any action comes to late anyway. Both arguments can – in his opinion - be 
overcome by establishing the credibility of the science. Thirdly, there is concern, that emis-
sion reductions and economic growth are incompatible. The next two positions (four and five) 
he describes, are the targets of the costs of emission reductions: on the one hand, some argue 
that emission reductions are too costly and on the other hand they have to be borne ‘up-front’. 
Furthermore (position six), emission reduction targets are considered unrealistic and cannot 
                                                           
18 The theoretical subsections closely follow Kollmann and Schneider (2010) as well as Kollmann, Reichl and 
Schneider (2011) 10 
 
be achieved due to a lack of political will. Lastly (position seven), there is no first mover ad-
vantage involved with imposing environmental policy. With these fundamental arguments in 
mind, we will now turn to analyzing the individual position of the actors involved. 
Figure 2: The interaction of economic agents from a public choice perspective 
Exogenous Conditions / Influences
From the Environment / Global Economy
Political System
--------------------------------




    Legislation         Executive
Administration       Administration
Green Interest Groups
-------------------------------------
1 4 3 2 ↔ ↔ ↔
Traditional Interest Groups
-------------------------------------




Source: Kollmann and Schneider (2010) 
In order to apply Public Choice’s analysis and get a clear impression of Japanese climate pol-
tics in practice, we immediately confront Public Choice arguments with the behavior of polit-
ical actors in Japan’s decision making process on greenhouse gas emission trading schemes 
(GHG ETS).
19 In accordance with the above given figure 3.1, the main actors in Japanese 
climate politics and the debate on GHG ETS are the general public or the voters, interest 
groups such as environmental and industry organizations, the ministries of the environment 
and economic affairs, and politicians of differing parties. 
   
                                                           
19 Due to the lack of sources in western languages, we chose a multiple-source approach (Yin 2009), extracting 
data not only from literature and primary written sources such as legal texts, policy documents, and speech man-
uscripts but also from more than 30 elite interviews (Grant 2000) with climate policy experts in Japan. 11 
 
3.1 Voters 
To start our actor-based analysis, we first take a close look at the democratic sovereign, the 
voting public. 
3.1.1 The Public Choice Perspective on Voters’ Behavior 
Citizens’/voters’ sensitivity towards environmental issues has continuously increased 
throughout recent decades. One indicator for this is that voters attach more and more im-
portance to the use of renewable energy sources. Wüstenhagen and Bilharz (2006) show that 
in Germany within the period 1984 to 2003 the public attitude towards energy sources has 
shifted notably from nuclear power to renewable energy sources (wind, solar). While in 1984 
only 17% of respondents expected wind energy to significantly contribute to Germany’s ener-
gy supply, in the following three decades the figure increased, to 42% in 2003. Public opinion 
analysis, undertaken by the European Commission, shows that 50% of European Citizens 
consider climate change a serious problem (see Table 3.1). In yet another survey for the Euro-
pean Commission, 97% of respondents considered environmental protection very or fairly 
important.
20  
A lack of information about market-based instruments in environmental policy, especially 
about energy taxes, is found in several studies.
21 One line of arguments why market-based 
instruments are not satisfactorily incorporated in environmental policies is, that this lack of 
information on the voters’ side is too costly to be overcome. Understanding the complexity of 
environmental issues requires higher education, interest and time to learn, therefore acquiring 
information is subject to high opportunity costs.
22 Klok et al. (2006) report that participants in 
a Danish focus group argued that “they could not accept something they did not understand”.  
Another aspect is that voters are more likely to accept a policy they are familiar with, as is the 
case with regulation or command-and-control measures, in contrast to market-based instru-
ments. Dresner et al. (2006) point out that “familiarity breeds affection: those being controlled 
regard it as ‘tolerable’ while an alternative approach might not be seen as such”. This position 
is also supported by Brännlund and Persson (2010) who find, that people generally dislike the 
word “tax” and are more willing to accept a policy that even though actually being a tax is 
labeled differently. That terminology itself may have a considerable influence on acceptance 
                                                           
20 See European Commission (2008a). 
21 For France see Deroubaix and Leveque (2004), for Ireland see Clinch and Dunne (2006), for Germany see 
Beuermann and Santarius (2006). 
22 Compare also Anthoff and Hahn (2010). 12 
 
is also shown in Clinch and Dunne (2006) who propose to relabeling taxes as charges, since 
‘tax’ is considered a ‘bad’ word.  
Kirchgässner and Schneider (2003) argue that selfish voting is a major obstacle to any kind of 
environmental policy. A data set that allows the analysis of individual characteristics of vot-
ing behavior was collected in Switzerland in the year 2000, when Swiss citizens voted on 
three proposals for taxes on fossil energy. Thalmann (2004) analyzed the data and found that 
political affinity and education played a role in voter behavior. Both citizens with an affinity 
to green and left-of-center parties and citizens with higher education had higher rates of par-
ticipation in the referenda and also higher rates of approval of the proposals, whereas income 
– ceteris paribus - did not significantly influence voting behavior. In another analysis of the 
votes on the three Swiss environmental proposals, Bornstein and Lanz (2008) found that so-
cially accepted norms and ideology do play a role in the referendum outcome and that price 
and/or income effects are not the only factors taken into account by voters.   
Considering the values of social discount rates discussed in the literature, it appears that vot-
ers care more about the here and now than about the future: In an overview of relevant papers, 
van der Bergh (2009) reports values of discount rates varying between 3 and 6%, where any 
social discount rate greater than 0% implies that a higher weight (importance) is given to early 
generations than to generations in the distant future.
23 Layton and Levine (2003) calculate a 
public discount rate of nearly 1%. Even though there is an ongoing dispute in the literature 
about the use and size of social discount rates, especially in view of the costs of fighting cli-
mate change, there is a widespread tendency to assume that voters at least to some extent, 
attach more value to the present than to some unknown future. Most interestingly, Halla et al. 
(2008) find that parents worry significantly more about CO2 emissions than citizens without 
children, which is another argument in favor of a non-zero inter-temporal discount rate.  
Summing up our theoretical discussion, we find three main issues that can explain why voters 
do not explicitly vote for the environment: firstly, the provision of the public good ‘environ-
ment’ allows free-rider behavior, secondly, the time delay between costs and benefits of envi-
ronmental policies (especially CO2 emission reduction) is difficult to explain and non-zero 
social discount rates diminish the future’s importance and thirdly, other more urgent issues, 
like unemployment or income growth, have a higher priority than less tangible environmental 
issues.  
                                                           
23 Compare Howarth (2001) and Ackerman et al. (2009). 13 
 
3.1.2 Interests and Influence of the Japanese Public 
Just as Public Choice predicts, political priorities of the Japanese public are not centered on 
environmental issues but rather on topics such as jobs and social security (Imura 2005: 78ff, 
Schröder 2003: 85f),
24 which suggests selfish voting-behavior. Recent economic crises have 
even intensified the emphasis on economic growth, so that environmental issues are not capa-
ble of significantly determining voters’ decisions in general elections. 
Nevertheless, starting with the severe environmental problems of the 1960s and 1970s (e.g. 
Minamata Disease, Itai Itai), environmental issues have steadily gained importance in the Jap-
anese public (Imura 2005: 78ff) just as in the German and European case given above. How-
ever, the visibility of the immediate effects was an important factor for public awareness. 
Climate change, on the other hand, lacks the immediate perceptibility of the problem and its 
consequences, as Reiche/Krebs (1999: 17) point out, even though recent catastrophes and 
media events
25 have made global warming and climate policy more widely visible. Politiciz-
ing the issue, however, is more difficult especially in the countries of the industrialized north-
ern hemisphere, because negative effects mainly burden less developed countries in the south 
and future generations; an aspect already emphasized by Public Choice. In Japan, a public 
awareness of climate change and the need to counteract has been shown in several surveys 
(COJ 2005, 2007). The Japanese public also overwhelmingly supports climate protection tar-
gets and policies, considering the EU as a role model (Hirata 2009, Ikkatai 2009, Yamagishi 
2009). However, there is a fear of additional financial burdens, and the willingness-to-pay for 
measures against climate change is low (JfS 2010, JPC 2010).
26 And, as Public Choice al-
ready claimed, the same is true for the state of knowledge on climate change and (market-
based) measures (Ikkatai 2009, Imura/Takeuchi 2009), whereat rational ignorance emphasized 
by Downs (1957) increases when questions become more specific (COJ 2005, JPC 2010). 
Choosing policy instruments is considered to be a genuine task of the government; particular 
interests towards policy instruments do not exist (Sugiyama 2009), which supports the Public 
Choice hypothesis of a lack of knowledge. Surveys show that the Japanese public generally 
considers measures for companies important; however, there is no clear preference for specif-
ic economic sectors to be focused or for means to be applied (JPC 2010, COJ 2005). Concern-
ing carbon markets, neither a basic understanding nor design preferences can be detected in 
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the Japanese public (Morotomi 2009). But there is a prejudice against the immoral trading of 
pollution rights. In addition, price incentives are generally deemed dispensable, because mor-
al-based action of the Japanese collective is considered to be sufficient for solving societal 
problems (Park 2009). 
The political influence of the Japanese public is rather low (Schröder 2003: 82).
27 Basically 
there are two options for Japanese citizens to engage politically: voting at general elections 
and joining interest groups. As votes in general elections, just as Public Choice supposes, are 
not cast on the basis of environmental or even climate policy considerations but rather based 
on economic and social issues, political pressure to act on global warming does not stem from 
voters behavior at the ballot box.
28 Creating political pressure by political protest – e.g. by 
joining environmental organizations or participating in demonstrations –, on the other hand, 
fails, because, as already mentioned by Olson (1965), incentives to free-ride apply. Even more 
important, there is a lack of tradition of political protest in Japan (Schröder 2003: 106). In-
stead, there is a deeply rooted trust in government and, even more, in the moral behavior of 
the Japanese collective. Demonstrations and other protest activities are deemed illegitimate 
and unqualified action against the democratically elected government and hence even against 
the Japanese society itself. In addition, collectivistic group-oriented thinking disqualifies pro-
testers as outsiders, who are not willing to participate in the joint effort of the Japanese society 
to improve its conditions (Imura 2005: 50, Lokowandt 2001: 71f). 
Summing up, while there is a general awareness of global warming and the need for action in 
the Japanese public, selfish voting based on economic and social issues prevail. (Market-
based) policy instruments are not considered to be of interest to voters and there is a lack in 
information on that issue; however there is an underlying distrust in tradable rights to pollute. 
Moreover, the general awareness does not create political pressure to act, because citizens do 
not yield significant power, neither as voters nor as protesters.
29 The Public Choice approach 
appears to be a valuable first step for analyzing voters’ behavior in environmental policy. 
However, it also becomes clear that exogenous factors such as the perceptibility of the prob-
lem and the political culture determine both interests and influence of the public. This has 
become most obvious when the 2011 melt-downs in the Fukushima nuclear power plants have 
brought up to 60,000 Japanese citizens on the streets of Tokyo, representing the biggest pro-
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test movement since the 1960s and being considered by some observers as the start of a major 
change in the Japanese political culture (Naß 2011). 
3.2 Politicians 
We now turn to analyze the second major political actor group, the politicians and their posi-
tions concerning the introduction of an ecological policy using market-based instruments. 
3.2.1 The Public Choice Perspective on Politicians’ Behavior 
Major questions from the Public Choice perspective are whether politicians are intrinsically 
motivated to engage in environmental policies, and whether they are in favor of market-based 
instruments.  
According to Mueller (2003) the standard political economy approach assumes a selfish be-
havior of politicians, where utility is gained by being re-elected and by reaching certain ideo-
logical policy goals. If re-election is modeled as a constraint, a politician will promote certain 
popular policies in order to meet the median voter’s preferences.
30 Weck-Hannemann (2008) 
argues that politicians are intrinsically motivated to implement instruments that are in line 
with their political ideology and increase their power or their personal income. Whether or not 
they can follow their own ideological goals or have to comply with the median voter’s de-
mands depends on how stringent the re-election constraint is. Then again, List and Sturm 
(2006) argue that the re-election constraint may be valid only for major political topics like 
overall government spending or income distribution, it may be less important for secondary 
issues like environmental policy: a view that is also supported by Franzese (2002). 
The question whether the re-election constraint is an important factor in a politician’s decision 
to engage in environmental policy can also be discussed in connection with the partisan hy-
pothesis, which means that the re-election constraint is valid only in election times, but does 
not influence the politician’s decisions throughout his term.
31  
According to Frey and Schneider (1978) the governing party that aims to stay in power will 
seek to please the median voter only if their re-election chances are low. If the re-election 
probability is high, they will undertake policies in line with their ideology. As we stated above, 
politicians want to be re-elected, in order to stay in power and to receive benefits. What does 
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31 See Tellier (2006) and Franzese (2002) for a review of empirical studies of partisan cycles and Maux (2009) 
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this mean for a politician’s intrinsic motivation to pursue environmental policies? Firstly vot-
ers value the environment but do not have complete information about environmental issues, 
their importance and the toolkit of instruments that can be used. Secondly they also fear being 
over-burdened financially. And thirdly, following List and Sturm (2006) environmental issues 
may be of only secondary interest to the median voter, but if secondary issues do not influ-
ence the median voter’s election decision, there may be voters who attach extraordinarily high 
importance to such issues. A politician may therefore be inclined to pursue this secondary 
policy in order to receive additional votes.  
Weck-Hannemann (2008) also points out that politicians are not completely tied to the median 
voter’s demands, because rational voters acquire political information only up to the point 
where the marginal cost of acquiring additional information equals the marginal benefits. As 
the single voter’s influence on an election outcome is marginal, this benefit from acquiring 
information is marginal, too. In consequence, with uninformed voters, politicians can pursue 
their own goals. This lack of information on the voters’ side offers leeway for interest groups 
to influence politicians according to their own motives.  
After arguing that a selfish politician may not be intrinsically motivated to promote ecological 
policies using market-based instruments, but reacts in line with the other actors’ interests, the 
question arises whether such a policy will be carried out efficiently. From our discussion so 
far, it follows that the design of a specific policy is strongly influenced by interest groups 
whose interests we will discuss in the following.  
3.2.2 Japanese Parliamentarians and Prime Ministers 
Due to the traditional way of policy making, politicians in Japan are not the most important 
political players in climate policy; however, in the end, they officially legitimize laws, and the 
Prime Minister exercises the guideline competence (Schröder 2003: 77ff, Imura 2005: 53ff). 
After the elections of the Lower and the Upper House in 2009 and 2010, the Democratic Party 
of Japan (DPJ), the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP), the Buddhist New Komei Party (NKP), 
Japan’s Communist Party (JCP), the Social-Democratic Party (SDP), the People’s New Party 
(PNP), and Your Party (YP) are part of the Japanese Diet. As the DPJ and the LDP are the 
major actors, we focus on these parties’ interests.
32 
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Generally speaking, as Public Choice predicts, climate policy is not a major political issue or 
even a goal in party programs, because climate policy does not represent a decisive voting 
issue for Japanese citizens and thus does not help selfish politicians to be re-elected (Adachi 
2009, Imura/Takeuchi 2009, Morotomi 2009). Hence, climate policy is only a marginal topic 
in manifestos, which also are only widely available since 2009, which adds to voters’ lack of 
information. In the public debate only individual voices are heard on the issue of climate poli-
cy, while the majority of parliamentarians are not interested. A coordinated positioning within 
parties is basically non-existent. 
However, the now ruling DPJ has a moderate left-wing ideology, thus, as Public Choice sug-
gests, leaning more to environmental topics than its major competitor, the LDP.
33 Still, even 
in the DPJ only a small number of party members are in favor of environmental positions, 
while the majority of DPJ parliamentarians care more about economic growth and job-related 
issues, because these are better suited for winning elections. Nevertheless, the DPJ, trying to 
please the at least somewhat ecologically-minded Japanese median voter in the pre-election 
period of 2008 and 2009, favored a climate protection act with ambitious targets,
34 all of 
which should be mainly reached by domestic reductions. A binding greenhouse gas emissions 
trading scheme (GHG ETS) is considered a very important instrument for the industrial sector 
and should be implemented within a year after the introduction of the climate protection act. 
The long-time ruling LDP leans to a more conservative and industry-friendly ideology. Hence 
and in line with Public Choice predictions, the Kyoto Protocol, although officially accepted, is 
considered unfair, and a climate policy forerunner role of Japan is declined due to the fear of 
competitive disadvantages. The LDP supports only less stringent targets
35 and considers the 
project-based Kyoto mechanisms as well as technology exports to be major parts of Japan’s 
climate protection strategy. The LDP also demands all major emitting countries to be part of a 
post-2012-regime and fair targets for Japan. A domestic GHG ETS is seen with skepticism. 
In terms of political power, parliamentarians are less important compared to the government 
and the ministries (Adachi 2009, Niizawa 2009). While they legitimize laws in the National 
Parliament, the drafting of the laws is almost solely done by the bureaucracy (Morishima 
2009). Parliamentarians suffer from information asymmetries due to Japan’s traditional way 
of policy making and a lack of resources such as personal staff (e.g. consultants, secretaries). 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
absolute volume cap. The PNP and the YP, on the other hand, do not hold specific climate policy positions, or 
they simply welcome a moderate green growth strategy (Green New Deal). 
33 For a comparison of party manifestos see WWF Japan (2010). For confirmation of positions by interviewees 
see also Adachi (2009), Asaoka (2009), Morotomi (2009). 
34 Concrete demands were -6% by 2008-2012, -25% by 2020, -80% by 2050 based on 1990 levels. 
35 Such as 15% by 2020 and 80% by 2050 with a 2005 base year. 18 
 
In addition, environmentally active parliamentarians are few in numbers in all parties and 
even the inter-party environmental working group of the Parliament, the kankyō zoku, is one 
of the smallest (Ikkatai 2009, Morotomi 2009, Niizawa 2009). 
On the individual party level, DPJ’s power was limited due to the dominance of the LDP 
since World War II (Adachi 2009, Morotomi 2009). Only DPJ’s landslide electoral victory of 
August 2009, when it gained almost two thirds of the seats and established itself as the leader 
of the still ruling left-wing coalition, earned significant influence to the DPJ. However, this 
political margin was soon reduced, when the DPJ lost seats and the absolute majority at the 
Upper House in the July 2010 elections. Not commanding over a two third majority in the 
Lower House anymore, which would allow overruling Upper House decisions, forces the DPJ 
to form coalitions, e.g. for passing a basic climate protection law. In addition, the DPJ cannot 
rely on ecologically-minded networks similar to the “Iron Triangle”. While the DPJ is affiliat-
ed with Japanese labor unions, in the field of climate policy this coalition does not hold due to 
labor unions’ fear for job loss resulting from ambitious domestic climate policy. LDP, on the 
other hand, has been dominating Japanese politics for decades, uninterruptedly establishing 
formal and informal networks within the “Iron Triangle” (Ikkatai 2009, Kawamura/Nishimura 
2009). While LPD’s major power source dried up due to DPJ’s electoral victory of 2009, seat 
losses of the DPJ in 2010 and the stable networks of LDP suggest a continuing strong position 
of the LDP, and hence preventively effective environmental policy measures. 
On the government level Japan has seen ten Prime Ministers since the Kyoto Conference. Still, 
due to the guideline competence, Prime Ministers in principle have a significant influence on 
climate policy in Japan. Compared to party position, Prime Minister – even though most of 
them have come from the LDP – have been decisively in favor of the Kyoto Protocol and 
even ambitious climate policy instruments, although there are differences in emphasis be-
tween individuals (Morotomi 2009). Most prominent recent proposals for ambitious climate 
policies were the following:
36 
•  Shinzo Abe (2006-2007)  had intensively studied the EU GHG ETS and  proposed 
„Cool Earth 50“ including a 50% global reduction target for 2050 and a -60-80% tar-
get for Japan (Abe 2007). 
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•  Yasuo Fukuda (2007-2008), reacting to international pressure around the two G8 
summits in Heiligendamm and Hokkaido and himself putting pressure on domestic 
opponents of GHG ETS such as the economics ministry, announced the introduction 
of a stringent domestic GHG ETS in the “Fukuda Vision” (Fukuda 2008a, b). 
•  Yukio Hatoyama (2009-2010), the first DPJ Prime Minister since the 1950s, following 
his election promises, declared a mid-term reduction target of 25% based on 1990 
emission levels and a basic climate protection law incorporating GHG ETS and a car-
bon tax (Hatoyama 2009). 
Hatoyama’s successors, however, focused on economic recovery after the world financial 
crisis of 2008 and especially after the devastating (Blume 2010). 
Summing up, party positions on climate policy and emissions trading are widely spread. 
While proponents such as the DPJ are still not capable of passing ambitious legislation on the 
issue and opponents such as the LDP remain highly influential, parliamentarians in general 
are only of minor political importance in Japan. Prime Ministers, on the other hand, have 
played an important and often supporting role in initiating climate policies. Again, exogenous 
conditions such as the political party spectrum and the current majority situation in the par-
liament are important determinants of politicians’ interests and influence. Nevertheless, Pub-
lic Choice gives a good first indication on selfish politicians’ preferences and their receptive-
ness for party ideologies and election cycles. 
3.3 Interest groups 
In modern democracies interest groups play a major role in forming public policy. Hence, we 
now turn to analyzing interest groups behavior in environmental policy, in which industry 
groups and environmental organizations are the major players. 
3.3.1 The Public Choice Perspective on Traditional and Green Interest Groups 
We argue that traditional interest groups do not prefer ecological policies, but prefer com-
mand-and-control measures over market-based instruments in environmental policy. We fur-
thermore argue that green interest groups strongly prefer ecological or environmental policies, 
but also favor command-and-control measures and have a weaker position in the policy mak-
ing process. In the following we analyze whether from these propositions, the restricted use of 
market-based instruments can be explained.  20 
 
If the lobbyists’ information is reliable and is used, then the question arises which attributes of 
an interest group will make them more successful in pursuing their individual goals. We label 
four: Firstly, traditional interest group lobbyists will have more financial backing than envi-
ronmental interest groups. Most interestingly, the so called Green-10, composed of the ten 
major environmental advocacy groups (BirdLife International, Climate Action Network Eu-
rope, CEE Bankwatch Network, European Environmental Bureau, European Federation of 
Transport and Environment, Health and Environment Alliance, Friends of the Earth Europe, 
Greenpeace Europe, International Friends of Nature, and WWF European Policy Office), re-
ceive substantial funding from the European Commission (excluding Greenpeace which has 
the policy not to accept financial support from governments, the EU or industry). The im-
portance of any interest group’s budget is shown by Eising (2007). He calculates within a 
regression model encompassing data from 800 interest groups, that the probability to have 
weekly contact with the European Commission is 50 % higher if an interest group has a budg-
et of 7.5 million euro compared to an interest group without such a budget. Secondly, with 
environmental issues, especially pollution control and alternative technologies, there is a 
strong information asymmetry between producers’ lobbyists and environmental lobbyists.  
Thirdly, Oates and Portney (2003) mention that environmental interest group’s object to mar-
ket-based instruments in environmental policy on philosophical grounds. In their line of think-
ing, permits and environmental taxes are interpreted as “rights to pollute” and are therefore 
immoral. Stavins et al. (1983) add that environmental interest groups furthermore argue that 
the possible damages from pollution are difficult to quantify and to monetize, which prevents 
the calculation of an accurate tax rate.  
Fourthly, as Becker (1983) famously described in his “Theory of Competition Among Pres-
sure Groups for Political Influence”, group size matters: the smaller the group the more effec-
tively it can lobby, which is why business lobbying tends to be more effective than lobbying 
for consumers.
37 Environmental groups are relatively weak due to their large group size and 
their poor financial backing. 
We see that lobbyists of industrial and business interest groups are relatively better equipped 
to influence policy making from an early stage on. The specific information and expertise of 
lobbyists is a crucial factor in policy-making which strengthens the relationship between ad-
ministrators and lobbyists. On the other hand environmental lobbyists, suffer from group size 
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and fewer financial resources which in reality can even result in a situation in which the lob-
byists are paid by the very organization they lobby. 
Gullberg (2008) furthermore shows that lobbying behavior in the European Union significant-
ly differs between traditional and green interest groups. Traditional interest groups lobby bu-
reaucrats (in the European context, the European Commission) while green interest groups 
lobby the European Parliament. From this we argue that traditional interest groups are more 
involved in early stages of policy making than green interest groups and may therefore better 
influence the evolution of a policy. Taking the EU-ETS as example, Markussen and Svendsen 
(2005) analyzed whether the final design of the EU-ETS can be explained by potential indus-
try winners or losers involved in the early stages of the policy making process. Their answer 
is ambiguous because on the one hand the industries’ main objective to install a voluntary 
system was not realized. But on the other hand, lobbying led to a policy design that benefited 
industry more than any other policy design that could have been realized.  
3.3.2 Japanese Interest Groups 
3.3.2.1 Environmental Organizations in Japan 
Major environmental organizations in Japanese climate politics are Kiko Network, World 
Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Japan Center for a Sustainable Environment and Society 
(JACSES) and Friends of the Earth Japan (FoEJ). The interests of these organizations are 
largely homogenous, welcoming ambitious climate policies (Kiko Network 2008).
38 In order 
to advance towards a Low Carbon Society and to contribute to reaching the global 2°C target, 
they demand ambitious reductions of greenhouse gases.
39 The reductions are to be achieved 
by a climate protection act, containing a verifiable roadmap for annual emission reductions. 
Hence, as Public Choice predicts, green groups favor ambitious targets and policies. 
At the policy instrument level, Japans environmental organizations support a domestic green-
house gas emissions trading system (GHG ETS), embedded in a policy mix similar to the one 
used in EU countries such as Germany (Adachi 2009, Hirata 2009, Yoshida 2009). Hence, 
with respect to instrument preferences, Public Choice appears to underestimate green groups’ 
acceptance of markets for environmental protection.
40 However, Japanese environmental or-
ganizations is consider a domestic GHG ETS to be advantageous, first and foremost, because 
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it represents a mandatory instrument, which could displace voluntary approaches favored by 
Japanese industries: „We want market-based instruments not because they‘re market-based, 
but because they’re mandatory“ (Yamagishi 2009). Mandatory instruments are considered 
indispensable for reaching Japan’s short-, mid-  and long-term climate protection targets; 
whereas the current policy mix seems to be insufficient. Furthermore, emissions trading estab-
lishes absolute volume limits to emissions, hence guaranteeing real reductions and the com-
pliance with climate protection targets: „We like the cap“ (Yamagishi 2010). Also, cost min-
imization is considered advantageous, because resources are also needed for other important 
societal purposes. Ultimately, emission trading introduces permanent incentives to innovate, 
reveals the actual costs of natural resource use, and the auctioning of allowances would estab-
lish the strong polluter pays principle. The main reason for this new openness towards mar-
kets of Japanese and also environmental organizations all over the world is an intense learning 
process during the Kyoto negotiations and the follow-up process, when theoretical merits 
have been laid out in detail, positive experiences – e.g. in US air pollution control – have been 
published, and economic thinking has spread via environmental economists and open-minded 
environmentalists (Rudolph 2005: 361, Hahn 2000). This process seems to have been able to 
overcome the philosophically-grounded skepticism of green groups towards emission markets. 
In terms of political power, even though, according to Olson (1965), the homogeneity of in-
terests increases the chances of interests to organize, Japanese environmental organizations’ 
influence is very low (Schröder 2003: 106ff, Imura 2005: 80ff).
41 First, Japanese environmen-
tal organizations lack members (Hirata 2009, Yoshida 2009, Yamagishi 2009, Adachi 
2010).
42 In 2009, membership in Japanese climate protection organizations accounted for 
21,000 individual and 450 institutions. Small membership numbers lower the capacity to cre-
ate significant political pressure, because environmental organizations cannot claim to repre-
sent relevant parts of the electorate, thus producing Scale Economies in the Production of 
Pressure (Endres/Finus 1996: 52f, Becker 1983), or to give orientation to voters, choosing 
ideologies (Downs 1957) instead of detailed political programs  (Morishima 2009). Low 
membership numbers can be attributed to incentives to free-ride (Olson 1965) but also to the 
lack of political participation culture in Japan. 
Supporting Public Choices’ argument, the budget of Japanese climate protection organizations 
is also small, adding up to not more than 10 million Euros (Adachi 2009, Hirata 2009, Yo-
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shida 2009, Yamagishi 2010).
43 Besides low membership numbers, a culture-based low will-
ingness-to-donate and the lack of tax incentives to donate limit the budgets of Japanese envi-
ronmental organizations. Insufficient financial resources, in turn, restrict the capacity to or-
ganize campaigns, pay for external expertise, and hire qualified personnel. Hence, staff num-
bers of Japanese climate protection organizations are rather small, especially if compared to 
industry groups. 70 full-time and 15 part-time employees work for Japanese environmental 
organizations, but only 10 of them are entirely occupied with climate change issues (Adachi 
2009, Hirata 2009, Yamagishi 2009, Yoshida 2009).
44 In addition, the majority of staff mem-
bers do not have an academic training background, because Japanese environmental organiza-
tions are not capable of paying graduates adequate salaries; also work experiences at envi-
ronmental groups are not considered career boosters. As a consequence, lobbying activities as 
well as participation in governmental hearings and commissions are limited due to a lack of 
well-informed staff. Also, for this reason, Japanese environmental organizations are them-
selves rather seldom capable of bringing forward elaborated policy proposals. 
Concerning access to policy making processes, Japanese environmental organization are not 
accepted to be on a par with political decision makers in the parliament or ministries, because 
they are seen as anti-society protest movements with a low level of expertise, and even envi-
ronmentally minded researchers hesitate to cooperate with environmental organizations in 
Japan (Adachi 2009, Ikkatai 2009). Informal meetings with politicians or public servants are 
rare, and official ways to voice opinions and influence law-making are limited. Shingikai, the 
traditional Japanese advisory commissions that are mainly set-up by ministries, in many cases 
work without participation of representatives from environmental organizations. But even if 
environmental organizations’ staff is invited, due to capacity limits, they are not capable of 
participating on a regular basis. 
Ultimately, building networks of climate policy proponents with other likeminded actors is a 
heavy task for Japanese environmental organizations (Hirata 2009, Yamagishi 2009, Yoshida 
2009), as there is a general distrust in protest movements motives, expertise, and capabilities 
especially in the politico-administrative system. Hence, even staffers  from environmental 
ministries or green parliamentarians are not willing to cooperate with environmental organiza-
tions, in turn hindering mutual understanding and concerted action. However, even willing-
ness to cooperate provided, there is a lack of potential partners for cooperation, because a 
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genuine green party or independent, ecologically minded research institutes are non-existent 
and green companies fear the loss of reputation in the business community if they openly side 
with environmentalists: „No company openly joins sides with NGOs“ (Hirata 2009). 
Summing up, Japanese environmental organizations support ambitious market-based climate 
policies including a domestic GHG ETS, which Public Choice only partially expected. The 
philosophically grounded skepticism of the past seems to have been overcome by an intense 
learning process. Environmental organizations’ political influence still is, in line with Public 
Choice arguments, low.
45 However, again, exogenous factors such as the political culture, the 
existence of policy networks, the level of economic knowledge, and the state of problem solu-
tions are important for political actors’ interests and influence. External shocks, such as the 
Fukushima nuclear melt-down are, e.g., capable of at least massively increasing the participa-
tion in protest movements (Naß 2011), while structural changes still need along time to unfold. 
3.3.2.2 Industry Groups in Japan 
Nippon Keidanren is the main industry actor in Japanese climate policy. In addition, Japanese 
steel companies such as Nippon Steel – representing energy intensive industries – and Japa-
nese power companies such as Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) play a major role.
46 
Climate policy interests of Japanese industries are quite homogenous, which, according to 
Olson (1965) adds to their influence. Ambitious market-based climate policies are, as ex-
pected by Public Choice, seen with utmost skepticism (Imura 2005: 74ff; Schröder 2003: 
100ff).
47 While basically climate policy is deemed necessary; already the Kyoto targets are 
judged to be unfair, due do Japan’s world leadership in energy efficiency.  Nevertheless, 
against the background of the Japanese code of honor, the bushido (Nitobe/Suchi 1998), and 
the fear of losing reputation, industry sticks to its promise given in the Voluntary Action Plan: 
„We would never give up our target“ (Takahashi/Nishimura 2009). As a return service, Japa-
nese industry expects the government to stick to its own promise not to implement additional 
measures as long as industry’s targets are met. However, reductions beyond the Voluntary 
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ponents would not openly cooperate with environmentalists, because of their traditional role as a part of the 
Japanese business sector and social pressure from other companies including Keidanren. 
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Action Plan commitments are declined, because they would increase production costs and 
lead to competitive disadvantages on the world market. For a Post-2012-regime, Japanese 
industry demands fair targets and the participation of all major emitting countries including 
China and the USA. Bottom-up intensity targets for specific industries branches based on re-
alistic technology options are considered to be better than country-based emissions caps. 
On the policy instrument level, again, Japanese industry prefers voluntary agreements as laid 
out in its Voluntary Action Plan; additional binding measures, however, are strictly opposed 
(Hasegawa 2009, Takahashi/Nishimura 2009, Yamada et. al. 2009). The Voluntary Action 
Plan is considered to be successful, targets are judged to be met, and the achievements are 
seen as a major contribution to Japan’s leading position in energy efficiency. Binding instru-
ments, thus, are deemed dispensable, because industry considers voluntarily given promises to 
reduce emissions to the target levels as binding; non-compliance would mean a loss of face. 
At the most, the time-tested combination of technology-oriented regulatory standards and 
subsidies would be accepted as a supplement to the Voluntary Action Plan. A national green-
house gas emissions trading system (GHG ETS), on the other hand, is, as Public Choice pre-
dicted, strictly opposed (Hasegawa 2009, Morotomi 2009, Otsuka 2009). It is argued that 
GHG ETS would only increase costs of production, lead to competitive disadvantages, and 
reduce liquidity needed for investments into efficiency and abatement technology. Leakage of 
emissions and jobs would be the consequence. In addition, Japanese industry claims to have 
valuable experiences with „Administrative Guidance“ and cooperation with regulating institu-
tions, while emissions trading is thought to induces unpredictable price fluctuations and spec-
ulation: the „money game“ (Funatsu 2009, Morishima 2009): „Government is better than 
markets“ (Yamada et. al. 2009). Also, industry fears that in the case of a domestic GHG ETS 
important political responsibilities, e.g. for energy policy, are to be transferred from the eco-
nomics ministry to the environment ministry, the latter of which is considered less reliable, 
over-idealistic, and outright hostile towards industry. In addition, from industry’s point of 
view, GHG ETS incorporates the planned-economy element of fixing an emissions cap, 
which, as a consequence, would prohibit economic growth. Ultimately, it is claimed that the 
initial allocation cannot be done in a fair way: While auctioning unjustifiably burdens industry, 
free-of-charge schemes inevitably induce unfair initial allocation outcomes due to govern-
ment’s involvement; this would also be true for the reimbursement of auction revenues. The 
only elements of GHG ETS worth considering is, according to Japanese industry, are the pro-
ject-based Kyoto mechanisms, because they enable Japanese companies with high marginal 
abatement costs to reduce emissions in countries with low costs, thus fostering exports. 26 
 
The political influence of traditional industries is decisive; together with the economics minis-
try, industry is the most important political player (Imura 2005: 74ff, Schröder 2003: 100ff).
48 
Keidanren bundles the interests of almost all Japanese companies in the industry sector into a 
homogenous set of positions (Takahashi/Nishimura 2009, Hasegawa 2009, Yamada et. al. 
2009). Homogeneity is created and free-rider incentives are overcome by strong social ties, 
loyalty, and the traditional Japanese group-orientation (Imura 2005: 50,  Lokowandt 2001: 
71f), but also by the main emitters’ promise to take over the major part of the reductions in 
exchange for solidarity on climate policy issue (Morotomi 2009). As a consequence, a tight 
industry alliance against ambitious market-based climate policy emerged: „It is hard to split 
Keidanren“ (Hirata 2009). Political strength is added to this coalition by the support of labor 
unions’, which fear job-loss due to stringent climate policies (Asaoka 2009). 
Access to the decision-making arena is granted first and foremost by the close cooperation of 
industry with the economics ministry and the long-time ruling Liberal-Democrats within the 
“Iron Triangle” (Takahashi/Nishimura 2009). Since World War II and against the background 
of Japan’s traditional consensus orientation these actors had jointly designed an industrial 
policy that led to the economic success of the Japan Inc. (Bosse 1997). Hence, most advisory 
councils are lined with industry representatives, enabling them to directly influence the prepa-
ration of policy drafts and the like. In exchange, companies offer highly rewarding job oppor-
tunities to former public servants, the so-called practice of amakudari. 
The “Iron Triangle” also established tightly knit personal networks amongst the actors in-
volved, all being basically opposed to ambitious market-based climate policies (Asaoka 2009, 
Hasegawa 2009, Imura/Takeuchi 2009). Hence, Keidanren disposes of close relations with 
Liberal-Democrat parliamentarians and economics ministry’s officials. In addition, Keidanren 
and its members finance their own research institutes – such as the Central Research Institute 
of Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI) – and have access to expertise of economics ministry’s 
research institutions (Sugiyama 2009). 
Keidanren’s political power is, just as Public Choice predicts, further enhanced by its finan-
cial resources, which, considering its 1,662 company members including market leaders such 
as Nippon Steel and TEPCO, are supposed to be huge in comparison with environmental or-
ganizations’ budgets. The same is true for staff numbers: Keidanren alone employs 20 people 
in different departments working on climate policy issues let alone individual companies’ 
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climate policy departments (Hasegawa 2009). Generous budgets and large staff numbers al-
low for intensive lobbying and costly campaign activities. 
As opposed to environmental organizations, Keidanren also disposes of significant market 
power. First, leaving industry with an information advantage Public Choice already expected, 
industry can provide decision-makers with exclusive information on internal cost structures of 
companies and technology potentials, which are necessary for implementing climate policies, 
e.g. for designing free-of-charge initial allocation schemes in GHG ETS (Adachi 2009). Se-
cond, industry has market power over jobs. In particular the energy intensive industries and 
the power sector have been responsible for creating jobs in the aftermaths of World War II, 
which now enables them to threaten decision-makers with moving jobs abroad in case of 
stringent climate policies (Hasegawa 2009, Yamada et. al. 2009). 
Summing up, Japanese industries are almost unanimously against ambitious market-based 
climate policies. They almost exert veto power in the decision-making on climate policy.
49 
While Public Choice again is capable of giving a fairly good estimation of political actors’ 
behavior, a careful case study provides a richer picture of determinants of political actors’ 
interests and influence, which in turn can be used to enrich Public Choice’s argumentation. 
Also, exogenous conditions such as the Japanese code of honor or informal political institu-
tions such as the “Iron Triangle” significantly determine actors’ interests and influence. In the 
latter case, however, there are early indications that the “Iron Triangle” may suffer a serious 
throwback from the publicity on the entanglement of TEPCO and the government in the oper-
ation and control of nuclear power plants after the Fukushima incident (Keuchel 2011). 
3.4 Bureaucracy 
Bureaucracies necessarily play an important role in environmental policy making in modern 
societies that are characterized by a sophisticated division of labor. 
3.4.1 The Public Choice Perspective on Bureaucracies’ Behavior 
According to Niskanen’s famous model of bureaucracy (Niskanen 1971), the head of any 
public administration unit seeks to maximize his unit’s budget, increase the number of his 
employees, and hence increase his power and importance.
50 In contrast to politicians bureau-
crats are not bound by re-election constraints. This holds for any administration authority 
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whether or not it is engaged in environmental policy, the result of budget-maximizing behav-
ior is that environmental administrations are highly motivated to implement environmental 
policy measures which require the most administrative controls as well as exhibiting the high 
costs. We assume that most members of ‘green’ public authorities identify themselves with 
the goals of their authority and are highly motivated. But being motivated need not necessari-
ly lead to favoring cost-efficient policy making. Especially with environmental policy that is 
largely tied to incentives that need to be given to the regulated party, the inefficiency aspect of 
command-and-control mechanisms also comes from the simple fact that administrators are not 
there to formulate or provide incentives or to encourage and reward the regulated ones, not to 
speak of any innovation beyond compliance with given requirements, as Rondinelli and Berry 
(2000) point out.  
When it comes to the question whether public administrations are in favor of market-based 
instruments using incentive orientated policy instruments and assuming budget-maximizing 
behavior, several factors need to be considered in order to explain why they favor command 
and control measures: firstly, command-and-control mechanisms exhibit high costs, since 
monitoring them is labor-intensive; secondly, with command-and-control mechanisms the 
administration has an information advantage that mainly derives from expert knowledge with-
in the authority compared to the government; thirdly, the administration simply knows what 
to do, which may not be the case with a new instrument; and fourthly, the public administra-
tion is needed for command-and-control mechanisms, but may be superfluous if, say, a com-
mand-and-control mechanism it is replaced by an environmental tax, or this may at least re-
quire a great degree of flexibility within the authority.
51  
3.4.2 The Public Administration in Japan 
In addition to Public Choices arguments on the decisive role of bureaucracies, the public ad-
ministration in Japan plays an even more important role than in other countries, due to the 
traditional way of policy making in Japan (Schröder 2003: Kap 3.1.3).
52 To a large extent it is 
responsible not only for implementing but also for preparing and drafting policies. The Japa-
nese Diet often only officially legitimizes draft laws elaborated by the bureaucracy, because, 
as Public Choice predicts, parliamentarians suffer from information disadvantages. For the 
purpose of program development and implementation, the Japan’s public administration is 
supplied with significant financial and personnel resources. Collecting, selecting and distrib-
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uting information are major tasks of officials. For this purpose ministries command over sev-
eral research institutes, which are directly tied to ministries and provide them with the neces-
sary expertise: „Government officials are Japan’s original think tanks“ (Morishima 2009). 
Ministry officials’ interests are strongly influenced by their academic training and the specific 
institutions and departments they are working at (Imura/Takeuchi 2009, Morishima 2009). 
Civil servants are almost exclusively trained at the University of Tokyo, a former imperial 
institution, which was established for the sole purpose of training public officials. Hence, of-
ficials very often do not have any other job experiences, allowing their preferences to be im-
mediately determined by their administration-oriented education. After leaving the university 
and being picked by ministries, due to traditional group-orientation in the Japanese society, 
officials show utmost loyalty to the goals of their respective ministries. Thus, Japanese civil 
servants are „mission driven“ (Ikkatai 2009) not in an intrinsic sense but in the sense of adher-
ing to the mission of the ministry they are employed at. The traditional strict separation of 
ministries in the Japanese political system then leads to egoisms and competition between 
ministries or even departments (Lokowandt 2001: 71f), in climate policy e.g. between the 
Ministry of the Environment (MoE) and the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry 
(METI). Hence, different from our theoretical analysis, we here differentiate between the eco-
nomic and the environmental affairs ministries of Japan. 
3.4.2.1 The Japanese Ministry of the Environment 
Already at the Kyoto negotiations, the Ministry of the Environment (MoE) favored ambitious 
reduction targets of up to -10% (Ikkatai 2009, Kawamura/Nishimura 2009).
53 Recently, the 
environmental ministry demanded a mid-term target of -15% by 2020 and -80% by 2050 
(base 1990). Nevertheless, the ministry wants Japan to be treated fairly in a new global regime, 
incorporating all major emitting countries. By being pro-active, the MoE tries to establish 
itself as the main authority in climate policy, one of the most important future political issues, 
intending to take over responsibilities from the economics ministry e.g. in energy policy, thus 
increasing its power and budget (Hasegawa 2009, Funatsu 2009). This in mind, the MoE in-
deed, as Public Choice indicated, supports ambitious climate policies. 
On the policy instrument level, however, the MoE has been engaged in promoting greenhouse 
gas emissions trading systems since the early 2000s (Ikkatai 2009, Imura/Takeuchi 2009, 
Kawamura/Nishimura 2009), which would contradict Public Choice’s predictions. However, 
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one major reason for the MoE supporting market-based instruments was again to take over 
control over the discussion on market-based climate policies in the competitive relation with 
the economics ministry, a motivation that would fit bureaucrats’ wish to enlarge their budget. 
In the years 2008 and 2009, a national GHG ETS was even declared the priority topic of the 
MoE, because the ministry understood former Prime Minister Fukuda’s promise at the G8 
summits at Heiligendamm and Hokkaido as a direct order to push for an ambitious Japanese 
GHG ETS (Fukuda 2008a, b). Also, the MoE appreciates the EU climate strategy including 
the EU GHG ETS as a success story and observes the global spreading of emissions trading 
especially to the USA and neighboring countries such as South Korea, New Zealand, and 
Australia. Ultimately, the MoE considers the established climate policy mix in Japan as a fail-
ure. It argues that the ambitious Japanese climate policy targets can only be reached by a 
stringent national GHG ETS with an absolute volume top-down cap, which would mean that 
their overall goal of protecting the environment could only be reached by a carbon market. 
Also, the MoE has recently been enabled to appreciate the advantages of emissions trading, 
first because economic knowledge within the ministry has increased, e.g. due to an influx of 
economic contents at Tokyo University’s curriculum, and second, because public officials had 
learned about the working mode and the effects of emissions trading during the Kyoto negoti-
ations and the follow-up process by close contacts with the USA and the EU (Ikkatai 2009, 
Morotomi 2009).
54 This is especially true for the Office of Market Mechanisms, which is in 
charge of the respective issues (Imura/Takeuchi 2009, Kawamura/Nishimura 2009, Otsuka 
2009). Within the Office, GHG ETS is considered the main instrument of future climate poli-
cy, because, like no other, it guarantees the compliance with absolute volume targets via the 
cap. There is even hope, that GHG ETS can displace voluntary instruments. In addition, GHG 
ETS can be linked internationally and in this way increase efficiency and overcome the stale-
mate in global climate policy. Ultimately, by administering the Japan Voluntary Emission 
Trading Scheme (JVETS), Office staff has acquired specific skills in handling GHG ETS, 
which could be utilized for an ambitious domestic system. Thus, Public Choice’s argument of 
bureaucrats preferring well-known and well-established instruments would still hold, because 
in the last decade major parts of the bureaucracy has become acquainted with emission trad-
ing schemes, and bureaucrats have been able to acquire specific knowledge on market-based 
instruments, which will not at all become superfluous in the case of a domestic carbon market 
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being implemented. Against the background of these interests, in early 2010 the Office – 
commissioned by the environmental ministry – presented a draft version of a domestic GHG 
ETS, which excelled in a top-down absolute volume cap and binding participation, thus being 
much more ambitious than the economics ministry’s of the same time (MoE 2010c). 
This said, even though the MoE as a whole and the Office are strongly in favor of GHG ETS, 
there are, as Public Choice initially suggested, officials in more traditional departments who 
favor the time-tested policy mix of command-and-control, subsidies, and voluntary action 
(Ichii 2009, Kawamura/Nishimura 2009). The major reason for this is the fact that, still, the 
majority of MoE’s officials are engineers, natural scientists, and, to a smaller extent, lawyers, 
lacking training in economics and appreciating the success of the respective policy mix in air 
and water pollution control in the 1970s and 1980s. However, the idea of a cap to emissions is 
widely understood and appreciated even by non-economist, thus leaving even traditional MoE 
officials in a wait-and-see-position rather than in direct opposition to emissions trading. 
In addition to the respective offices within the MoE, the ministry also operates several adviso-
ry councils on climate policy issues, in order to comply with the consensus-orientation typical 
for policy-making in Japan (Imura 2005: 67, GoJ 2006: 33).
55 The supreme commission is the 
Central Environment Council, where emissions trading has been discussed since the early 
2000s. Since 2005, a subcommittee is commissioned to elaborate and evaluate alternative 
design options for a domestic GHG ETS. The subcommittee is mainly composed of environ-
mentally-minded researchers and industry representatives; environmental organizations, on 
the other hand, are excluded due to the ministry’s and industry’s distrust in their capabilities, 
importance, and willingness to cooperate. In 2010 the subcommittee brought forward a report, 
discussing key elements of a domestic GHG ETS, but lacking a clear-cut recommendation for 
a particular design and leaving many crucial issues unsolved (MoE 2010d). 
The political power of the MoE is small, despite the general importance of the public admin-
istration underlined by Public Choice and even strengthened in Japan, especially if compared 
with the economics ministry (Imura 2005: 56ff):  „[MoE] is positioned at the lower end of 
Japan’s unofficial ministerial hierarchy“ (Schröder 2003: 88). Thus,  our differentiation of 
ministries appears appropriate. The reasons for MoE’s political weakness are the following: 
First, the environmental ministry’s responsibilities do not cover energy policy, which still 
resides with the economics ministry (Adachi 2009, Funatsu 2009). Second, financial and per-
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sonnel resources are comparatively small (Asaoka 2009, Morotomi 2009).
56 Third, the MoE, 
even if it commands over its own research institutes such as the National Institute for Envi-
ronmental Studies (NIES) and the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES), does 
not offer exclusive information such as technology potentials or company cost offered by the 
economics ministry (Adachi 2009). Fourth, the MoE moved from agency to ministry status 
only in 2001, making it one of the youngest ministries in Japan (Imura/Takeuchi 2009, Ka-
wamura/Nishimura 2009). As a consequence, the environmental ministry lacks valuable net-
works and an institutionalized alliance such as the “Iron Triangle” (Ikkatai 2009, Kawamu-
ra/Nishimura 2009). Environmental organizations are considered worthless to work with, a 
green party does not exist, green wings of established parties are politically weak, and inde-
pendent green research institutes do not exist (Park 2009). 
Summing up, while the MoE and its sub-bodies to a large extent support ambitious climate 
policies including GHG ETS, it lacks political power to carry its point. In this case, budget 
and target orientation of bureaucrats emphasized by Public Choice has led to interests favor-
ing market-based instruments and environmental ministry’s power is strictly limited by its 
cabinet counterpart, the ministry of economic affairs.
57 In addition, again exogenous condi-
tions such as staff members’ educational background and the ministerial responsibilities are 
important determinants of interests and influence. 
4.3.2 Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry 
Within the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) environmental issues are dealt 
with in the Environmental Policy Division, which also determines the economics ministry’s 
position on climate policies (Shimizu/Takahashi 2009). Basically, the METI supports climate 
policies in the cases of win-win- or no-regret-solutions for industry such as increasing energy 
efficiency or exporting efficiency technology; cost-inducing ambitious market-based climate 
policy, however, are seen with utmost skepticism (Imura/Takeuchi 2009, Morotomi 2009, 
Shimizu/Takahashi 2009). Hence, while the Kyoto-target is officially tolerated due to the 
METI being a part of the Japanese government, which agreed on the Protocol and now – ac-
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cording to the Japanese code of honor – has to fulfill its promise, economics ministry officials 
still consider the target to be unfair for the Japanese economy. Concerning future goals, only a 
stabilization of emissions on the 1990 level by 2020 appears feasible to the METI staff. Fur-
thermore they claim that rigid absolute volume targets by country are not capable of balancing 
the important issues of economic growth and climate protection. A forerunner position of Ja-
pan would result in competitive disadvantages and carbon leakage to non-Kyoto countries. 
Internally, the METI also fears the shift of responsibilities for energy policies to the environ-
mental ministry in case of ambitious market-based climate policies (Hasegawa 2009, Funatsu 
2009). Altogether, Japanese industry considers the economics ministry’s position to be pro-
tecting its interests: „METI protects industry“ (Hasegawa 2009). 
On the policy instrument level, a domestic GHG ETS is opposed by the METI mainly due to 
its potential to increase production costs by charging full emission costs to polluters (Shimi-
zu/Takahashi 2009). Also, absolute volume caps are feared as being a limit to growth. The 
Voluntary Action Plan, on the other hand, is considered to be successful, and as long as indus-
try complies with its targets, there seems to be no need to implement additional measures. 
GHG ETS is judged to be a good idea in general, but in Japan – with its specific regulation 
history and economic and political structure – other alternative are thought to be equally rea-
sonable. Again, there is a fear that GHG ETS would shift responsibilities for energy policy 
from the METI to the environmental ministry (Adachi 2009). Against this background, the 
economics ministry did not support the environmental ministry’s Japan Voluntary Emission 
Trading Scheme (JVETS) of 2005. The Integrated Domestic Market of Emissions Trading 
(IDMET), on the other hand, was supported by the economics ministry due to the political 
pressure of Prime Minister Fukuda’s announcement at the G8 summits of Heiligendamm and 
Hokkaido. However, support was only granted, because many of the METI’s demands such as 
voluntary participation, intensity targets, and generous acceptance of offsets and borrowing 
were accommodated, thus bringing the Integrated Domestic Market of Emissions Trading 
(IDMET) close to the design of the Voluntary Action Plan (Park 2009, Shimizu/Takahashi 
2009, Yamagishi 2009). In early 2010, again, the METI published a proposal for a climate 
policy mix, which only incorporated GHG ETS as a minor measure and with a design very 
close to the Voluntary Action Plan (METI 2010). 
Just as the environmental ministry, the METI operates several advisory councils working on 
environmental issues such as the Advisory Council for Natural Resources and Energy (GoJ 
2006: 33). GHG ETS is mainly dealt with at the Policy Mix Subcommittee (Morishima 2009, 
Otsuka 2009). Again, this subcommittee is dominated by industry representatives and re-34 
 
searchers from METI-affiliated institutes. Representatives from environmental organizations 
were excluded in 2010 after a period of reluctant participation; environmental economists are 
not accepted, because they are considered environmentalists by METI officials and industry 
people (Morotomi 2009, Morishima 2009). The Subcommittee’s report of 2010 was the major 
basis of the economics ministry’s policy mix proposal of the same year (METI 2010). 
The political power of the METI is big; it represents the second most important climate policy 
player besides Keidanren (Morotomi 2009, Otsuka 2009, Sugiyama 2009). First and foremost, 
the economics ministry has the important responsibility for energy policy (Hasegawa 2009). 
Second, the METI is an integral part of the “Iron Triangle”, supplying it with valuable net-
works and exclusive, industry-internal information (Imura/Takeuchi 2009). Besides its own 
research institutes such as the Research Institute of Innovative Technology for the Earth 
(RITE), the METI closely cooperates with industry-affiliated research institutes  such as 
CRIPIE, which alone obtains 20-30% of its budget from the economics ministry (Sugiyama 
2009). In this setting, the METI has been a key factor in Japan’s economic success after 
World War II, helping to build the Japan Inc. by „Administrative Guidance“ and close coop-
eration with industry. Third, the METI is by far the biggest ministry in Japan, commanding 
over huge financial and staff resources.
58 
Summing up, the METI is highly skeptical about ambitious, cost-inducing market-based cli-
mate policies, its position very much corresponding with industry’s interests. Also, its influ-
ence on climate policy is considerably bigger than environmental ministries power. The Pub-
lic Choice literature on environmental policy has so far not taken into account the behavior of 
economics ministries, which in practice appear to play a decisive role and hence should be 
included in future Public Choice analysis on environmental policy. Also, again, exogenous 
conditions such as ministry affiliation of staff members and traditional regulatory responsibili-
ties play a decisive role, in preventing effective environmental policy measures. 
4 Summary and Conclusions 
Japan is one of the biggest emitters of greenhouse gases and still far away from complying 
with its Kyoto target. Carbon markets have been used in Japan policy since 2005, but the ex-
periences have been disappointing. Major emission reductions have not been achieved and a 
functioning carbon market does not exist. In order to explain these deficiencies we have used 
                                                           
58 The METI’s budget in the Outline for Promotion to Prevent Global Warming was a third of the total budget 
and three times the size of the MoE’s resources; also, there were no budget cuts for the METI (GoJ 2006: 37). 
METI employed 8,528 officials in 2006 (including all local branches), eight times as many as the MoE (Ikkatai 
2009). 30 people alone are dealing with market-based climate policy issues in 2009 (Shimizu/Takahashi 2009). 35 
 
the Public Choice approach, analyzing the behavior of voters, politicians, interest groups, and 
the public administration in order to find out why so little has been accomplished. 
In the Public Choice analysis of voters there are three main issues that can explain why voters 
do not explicitly vote for the environment: firstly, the provision of the public good ‘environ-
ment’ allows free-rider behavior, secondly, the time delay between costs and benefits of envi-
ronmental policies (especially CO2 emission reduction) is difficult to explain and non-zero 
social discount rates diminish the future’s importance and thirdly, other more urgent issues, 
like unemployment or income growth, have a higher priority than less tangible environmental 
issues. For the politicians we find that after arguing that a selfish politician may not be intrin-
sically motivated to promote ecological policies using market-based instruments, but reacts in 
line with the other actors’ interests, the question arises whether such a policy will be carried 
out efficiently. From our discussion so far, it follows that the design of a specific policy is 
strongly influenced by interest groups. Turning to the interest groups we realize, that lobbyists 
of industrial and business interest groups are relatively better equipped to influence policy 
making from an early stage on. The specific information and expertise of lobbyists is a crucial 
factor in policy-making which strengthens the relationship between administrators and lobby-
ists. On the other hand environmental lobbyists, suffer from group size and fewer financial 
resources which in reality can even result in a situation in which the lobbyists are paid by the 
very organization they lobby. The public administration is not in favor of an effective envi-
ronmental policy using incentive orientated instruments due to the following three reasons: 
firstly, command-and-control mechanisms exhibit high costs, since monitoring them is labor-
intensive; secondly, with command-and-control mechanisms the administration has an infor-
mation advantage that mainly derives from expert knowledge within the authority compared 
to the government; thirdly, the administration simply knows what to do, which may not be the 
case with a new instrument; and fourthly, the public administration is needed for command-
and-control mechanisms, but may be superfluous if, say, a command-and-control mechanism 
is replaced by an environmental tax, or this may at least require a great degree of flexibility 
within the authority. 
If we confront these theoretical insights with the Japanese situation we conclude the follow-
ing:  
(1) While there is a general interest in the Japanese society for environmental issues and 
climate change, this does not result in environmentally oriented voting behavior or 
even activities in protest movements. However, the Fukushima melt-down is changing 36 
 
this attitude significantly. There are already first indicators that point to a more active 
civil society: Anti-nuclear-power-protests such as the 60,000 people demonstration on 
September 19
th, 2011 in Tokyo have united significant numbers of people across polit-
ical spectrums and the distrust in the government and bureaucracies increased dramat-
ically. However, while some researchers claim a “Generation March 11
th” (Coulmas in 
Naß 2011) to be more politically involved, others do not believe in the new movement 
to overcome socio-cultural dispositions against civil protest (Okumura in Naß 2011).  
(2) Climate policy interests of Japanese politicians strongly depend on party affiliation. 
While the now-ruling left-wing party favors ambitious climate policies, the conserva-
tive party is more skeptical. Parliamentarians’ power, however, is small due to the tra-
ditional dominance of the bureaucracy. And despite of the left-wing party’s political 
victory in the last general elections, they are faced with a weakening majority in the 
Japanese Diet and traditionally effective networks of the conservative party with in-
dustry groups and the economics ministry.  
(3) Recent failures in making significant changes such as the removal of U.S. military 
forces from Okinawa, the re-empowering of parliamentarians, or the disempowerment 
of utilities (Blume 2010) suggest, that it will be very hard to establish a political con-
sensus on ambitious carbon markets in Japanese politics. Regarding interest groups, 
environmental organizations strongly favor an ambitious market-based climate policy, 
but they are close to powerless due to low membership numbers, a lack in public ac-
ceptance, and negligible financial resources.  
(4) Industry groups, which to great extent are against ambitious climate policies, are ex-
tremely powerful due to their homogeneity, abundant resources, and their traditional 
involvement in policy making in Japan. Although participation in protest movements 
and distrust in industry have significantly increased after the Fukushima incident 
(Keuchel 2011), the traditional power balance appears to be far from experiencing a 
major change in the foreseeable future.  
(5) Within the public administration, which in general is the centre of political decision 
making in Japan, an intense struggle between the environmental and the economics 
ministry is taking place. While the rather small, less well-equipped, and traditionally 
rather insignificant environmental ministry to a large extent favors ambitious carbon 
markets, the most powerful economics ministry leans to industry positions and only 
accepts win-win- or no-regret measures in climate policy. Recently, although the now-
ruling left-wing party promised to clip bureaucracies’ power (DPJ 2009) and the close 37 
 
affiliation of the economics ministry with utilities such as the Fukushima plant’s oper-
ating company TEPCO raised opposition in the Japanese society (Keuchel 2011), 
chance to overcome this situation are small due to the well-established institutional 
setting. 
To summarize, Public Choice theory appears to provide a very good first approximation to the 
explanation of environmental policy-making based on rational political actors’ behavior and 
even to predicting the outcome of such processes. Still, this paper has also shown that analyz-
ing individual cases may provide highly valuable insights into environmental policy making 
in practice, which can be used to improve Public Choice argumentations. In this context, most 
importantly, environmental groups no longer seem to be against market-based instruments as 
are environmental bureaucrats. Also, the political power of environmental bureaucracies ap-
pears to be outbalanced by their cabinet counterparts in the ministries of economic affairs. In 
addition, the Public Choice analysis of environmental policy could greatly benefit from incor-
porating more thoroughly exogenous conditions and influences. While we have already in-
cluded these factors on a cursory level based on early ideas by Schneider/Volkert/ (1999) and, 
and while there are also some recent ideas for this inclusion e.g. by Nutzinger/Rudolph (2007), 
further research is needed in this field. 
Our final conclusion is the following: For the Japanese case, the prospects of having ambi-
tious carbon markets in place in the near future are rather bad. The well-established power 
balance appears to be hard to overcome. However, especially after the Fukushima melt-down, 
there is still hope that the Japanese civil society might increase its influence and put enough 
pressure on the government and the public administration to rethink its energy and climate 
policy strategy and contribute to an efficient and effective market-based climate policy. 
5. Literature 
Abe, S. (2007): Invitation to Cool Earth 50. In: http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/abespeech/ 
2007/05/24speech_e.html (June 30
th, 2009) 
Adachi, J. (2009): Personal Interview with Sven Rudolph. Kyoto, February 24
th, 2009 
Anthoff, D. and R. Hahn (2010). Government failure and market failure: on the inefficiency 
of environmental and energy policy. Oxf Rev Econ Policy 26, 197-224. 
Asaoka, M. (2009): Interview mit Sven Rudolph. Kyoto, February 14
th, 2009 
Aso, T.  (2009): Speech on the Environment. In: http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/aso 
speech/2009/06/10kaiken_ e.html (July 1
st, 2009) 38 
 
Becker, G. S. (1983): A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influ-
ence. In: Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98(3), 371-400 
Beuermann, C. and T. Santarius (2006). Ecological tax reform in Germany: handling two hot 
potatoes at the same time. Energy Policy 24, 917-929 
Blume, G. (2010): JAPAN – Japans Joschka. In: http://www.zeit.de/2010/24/Japan-Premier 
(June 10th, 2010) 
Boehringer, C. and C. Vogt (2004). The dismantling of a breakthrough: the Kyoto Protocol as 
symbolic policy, Eur J Polit Econ 20(3), 597-617 
Bornstein, N. and B. Lanz (2008). Voting on the environment: Price or ideology? Evidence 
from Swiss referendums. Ecol Econ 67, 430–440 
Bosse, F. (1997): Wirtschaftliche Strukturen. In: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (ed.) 
(1997): Japan (Informationen zur politischen Bildung 255), 32-40 
Brandt, U.S. and G.T. Svendsen (2002). Rent-seeking and grandfathering: The case of GHG 
trade in the EU. Working paper 35/02, Department of Environmental and Business Eco-
nomics. 
Brännlund, R. and L. Persson (2010). Tax or no tax? Preferences for climate policy attributes. 
Working paper, Centre for Environmental and Resource Economics 
Broadbent, J. (1999): Environmental Politics in Japan: Networks of Power and Protest. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press 
Chang, C. and G.K. Trunbull (2002). Bureaucratic behavior in the local public sector: A re-
vealed preference approach. Public Choice 113 
Clinch, J. and L. Dunne (2006). Environmental tax reform: an assessment of social responses 
in Ireland. Energy Policy 34, 950–959. 
COJ (2005): chikyu ondanka taisaku ni kansuru yoron chosa. Tokyo 
COJ (2007): chikyu ondanka taisaku ni kansuru yoron chosa. Tokyo 
Crocker, T. D. (1966): The Structuring of Atmospheric Pollution Control Systems. In: 
Wolozin, Harold (ed.): The Economics of Air Pollution. New York: Norton. 61-85 
Dales, J. H. (1968a): Land, Water, and Ownership. In: Canadian Journal of Economics, 1(4), 
791-804 
Dales, J. H. (1968b): Pollution, Property and Prices. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 
Downs, A. (1957): An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row 
DPJ (2009): Manifesto. Tokyo 39 
 
Dresner, S., L. Dunne, P. Clinch, and C. Beuermann (2006). Social and political responses to 
ecological tax reform in Europe: An introduction to the special issue. Energ. Policy 34, 
895–904 
Eisling, R. (2007). Institutional Context. Organizational Resources and Strategic Choices. 
European Union Politics 8, 329-362 
Ellerman, A. D. et al. (2000): Markets for Clean Air: Cambridge University Press 
Ellerman, A. D. et al. (2010): Pricing Carbon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Endres, A. (2010): Environmental Economics – Theory and Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
EU Commission (2008a). Attitudes of European Citizens towards the Environment. Report 
Special Eurobarometer 247, European Commission: Brussels. Belgium 
Franzese, R. J. (2002). Lectoral and Partisan Cycles in Economic Policies and Outcomes. An-
nu Rev Polit Scie 5(1), 369 
Frey, B. S. and F. Schneider (1978). A Politico-Economic Model of the United Kingdom. 
Econ J 88(350), pp.243-253 
Fukuda, Y. (2008a): Special Address on the Occasion of the World Economic Forum. In: 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/wef/2008/address-s.html (June 30th, 2009) 
Fukuda, Y. (2008b): teitanso shakai nippon wo mezashite. In: http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/ 
hukudaspeech/2008/06/09speech.html (July 1
st, 2009) 
Funatsu, H. (2009): Personal Interview with Sven Rudolph. Tokyo, March 30
th, 2009 
GoJ (2006): Japan’s Fourth National Communication under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. Tokyo 
GoJ (2008): Kyoto Protocol Target Achievement Plan (totally revised). Tokyo 
GoJ (2010): Japan’s Fifth National Communication under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. Tokyo 
Grant, W. (2000): Elite Interviewing – A Practical Guide. Birmingham: University of Bid-
mingham (IGS Discussion Papers) 
Gullberg, A. T. (2008). Lobbying friends and foes in climate policy: The case of business and 
environmental interest groups in the European Union. Energy Policy 36, 2964-2972 
Hahn, R. W. (1989): Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Problems: How the Patient 
Followed the Doctor's Orders. In: Journal of Economic Perspectives 3(2), 95-114 
Hahn, R. W (2000): The Impact of Economics on Environmental Policy. In: Journal of Envi-
ronmental Economics and Management 39, 375-399 40 
 
Hahn, R. W. /Hester, G. L. (1989): Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA's 
Emissions Trading Program. In: Yale Journal on Regulation 6(1) 109-153 
Halla, M., F. Schneider, and A. Wagner (2008). Satisfaction with Democracy and Collective 
Action Problems: The Case of the Environment. Working Paper No. 0808, Department of 
Economics at the Johannes Kepler University: Linz, Austria. 
Hasegawa, M. (2009): Personal Interview with Sven Rudolph. Tokyo, March 6th, 2009 
Hatoyama, Y. (2009): The Hatoyama Initiative. In: http://www. asahi.com/english/Herald-
asahi/TKY200909080029.html (September 17th, 2009) 
Hirata, K. (2009): Personal Interview with Sven Rudolph. Tokyo, March 9th, 2009 
Ichii, R. (2009): Personal Interview with Sven Rudolph. Tokyo, April 1
st, 2009 
IDMET-Secretariat (2008): Experimental Emissions Trading Scheme – Guidelines. Tokyo 
IEA (2009): Progress with Implementing Energy Efficiency Policies in the G8. Paris 
Ikkatai, S. (2009): Personal Interview with Sven Rudolph. Kyoto, February 17
th, 2009 
Imura, H. (2005): Japan’s Environmental Policy: Institutions and the Interplay of Actors. In: 
Imura, Hidefumi/Schreurs Miranda A (eds.): Environmental Policy in Japan. Cheltenham, 
Northampton: Edward Elgar 
Imura, H./Takeuchi, T. (2009): Personal Interview with Sven Rudolph. Nagoya, March 18
th, 
2009 
Imura, H./Schreurs, M. A. (2005): Environmental Policy in Japan. Cheltenham/Northampton: 
Edward Elgar 
JfS (2010): Public Says Japan Should Move Quickly on Climate Change. In: http://www. 
japanfs.org/en/pages/029702.html (February 23
rd, 2010) 
JPC (2010): The Internet Survey on Global Warming. In: http://www.jpc-net.jp/eng/research/ 
2010_04.html (July 15
th, 2010) 
Kawamura, R. (2010): Result Experimental ETS (personal correspondence with Sven Ru-
dolph, June 2010) 
Kawamura, R./Nishimura, H. (2009): Personal Interview with Sven Rudolph. Tokyo, Febru-
ary 26, 2009 
Keidanren (2008): Basic Standpoint on Climate Change Negotiations at the G8 Hokkaido 
Toyako Summit. Tokyo 
Keidanren (2010): Achieving a Low Carbon Society of Global Scale. Tokyo 
Keuchel, J. (2011): Japans Atomlobby – Wenn Aufseher zu Anstiftern warden. In: 
http://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2011-08/japan-atomlobby (August 2nd, 2011) 
Kiko Network (2008): The NGO Approach towards a Low Carbon Society. Kyoto 41 
 
Kirchgässner, G. And F. Schneider (2003), On the political economy of environmental policy, 
Public Choice 115/3, pp. 369-396, 2003. Lokowandt, Ernst (2001): Shonto. Munich: IU-
DICIUM 
Klok, J., A. Larsen, A. Dahl, and K. Hansen (2006). Ecological Tax Reform in Denmark: his-
tory and social acceptability. Energy Policy 34, 905–916 
Kollmann, A. and F. Schneider (2010). Why Does Environmental Policy in Representative 
Democracies Tend to Be Inadequate? A Preliminary Public Choice Analysis. Sustainability 
2010, 2(12), pp. 3710-3734.  
Kollmann, A., Reichl, J. and F. Schneider (2011): Why is environmental policy in representa-
tive democracies inadequate? A preliminary Public Choice analyses, Institut für Volkswirt-
schaftslehre, Energieinstitut an der JKU Linz, Diskussionspapier, Linz Juni 2011. 
Layton, D. F. and R. Levine (2003). How Much does the Far Future Matter? A Hierarchical 
Bayesian Analysis of the Public’s Willingness to Mitigate Ecological Impacts of Climate 
Change. J. Am. Stat. Assoc. 98, 533–544 
List, J.A. and D.M. Sturm (2006). How Elections matter: Theory and Evidence from Envi-
ronmental Policy. Q J Econ 121, 1249-1281 
Llewellyn, J. (2010). The Political Economy of National Climate Change Mitigation Policies. 
OECD Working paper ECO/CPE/WP1(2010)18 
Markussen, P. and G. T. Svendsen (2005). Industry lobbying and the political economy of 
GHG trade in the European Union. Energy Policy 33, 245-255 
Markussen, P., G. T. Svendsen, and M. Vesterdal (1998). The political economy of a tradea-
ble GHG permit merket in the European Union. Technical report, Aarhus School of Busi-
ness 
Maux, B. L. (2009). Governmental behavior in representative democracy: a synthesis of the 
theoretical literature, Public Choice 141, 447-465 
METI (2010): Japan’s Approach to Global Warming Issues. Tokyo 
MoE (2008a): Outline and Results of Japan’s Voluntary Emissions Trading Scheme. Tokyo 
MoE (2008b): Approach to Japanese Emissions Trading Scheme Interim Report. Tokyo 
MoE (2009a): National Greenhouse Gas Inventory. Tokyo 
MoE (2009b): Current Status of the Emissions Trading Scheme in Japan. Tokyo  
MoE (2009c): Japan’s Voluntary Emissions Trading Scheme (JVETS). Tokyo.  
MoE (2009d): Climate Change Policy and Emissions Trading in Japan. Tokyo 
MoE (2010a): The Current Status of the Emissions Trading Scheme in Japan. Tokyo 
MoE (2010b): International Linkage in Emissions Trading. Tokyo 42 
 
MoE (2010c): Scheme Options for Japanese Emissions Trading Scheme. Tokyo 
MoE (2010d): Key Features of Domestic Emissions Trading Scheme in Japan. Tokyo 
Morishima, A. (2009): Personal Interview with Sven Rudolph. Tokyo, March 13
th, 2009 
Morotomi, T. (2009): Personal Interview with Sven Rudolph. Kyoto, February 10
th, 2009 
Mueller, D. C. (2003): Public Choice III. Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press. 
Naß, M.  (2011):  Japan  –  Generation 11. März. In: http://www.zeit.de/2011/44/Japan-
Regierung (November 2, 2011) 
Niizawa, H. (2009): Personal Interview with Sven Rudolph. Kobe, April 10
th, 2009 
Niskanen, W. (1971), Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Aldine-Atherton Nitobe, 
Inazo / Suchi, Tokuhei (1998): Bushido. Tokyo / New York / London: Kodansha 
Nitobe, I./Suchi, T. (1998): Bushido. Tokyo/New York/London: Kodansha 
Nutzinger, H. G./Rudolph, S. (2007): Mediating between Political and Economic Science by 
Societal Order Parameters – The Case of Environmental Policy Instrument Choice. In: 
Paiva, Amadeu (ed.): Sob o Signo de Hórus – Homenagem a Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira. 
Lisboa: Colibri. pp. 171-197 
Nutzinger, H. G./Rudolph, S. (2011): Zur Relevanz qualitativer Fallstudien in der Neuen Poli-
tischen Ökonomie der Umweltpolitik. In: Dreger, Christian/Kosfeld, Reinhold/Türck, 
Matthias (2011): Empirische Regionalforschung heute. Wiesbaden: Gabler. 283-309 
Oates, W. E. and P. R. Portney (2003). The political economy of environmental policy. In K. 
G. Mäler and J. R. Vincent (Eds.), Environmental Degradation and Institutional Responses, 
Volume 1 of Handb Environ Econ, pp 325-354. Elsevier: Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
OECD (2002): Implementing Domestic Tradeable Permits. Paris 
OECD (2004): Tradeable Permits. Paris 
Olson, M. (1965): The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 
Otsuka, T. (2009): Personal Interview with Sven Rudolph. Tokyo, March 2
nd, 2009 
Park, S.-J. (2009): Personal Interview with Sven Rudolph. Kyoto, April 13
th, 2009 
Pohl, M. (2004): Geschichte Japans. Munich: Beck 
Reiche, D./Krebs, C. (1999): Der Einstieg in die Ökologische Steuerreform. Frankfurt et al.: 
Peter Lang 
Rondinelli, D. A. and M. A. Berry (2000). Corporate Environmental Management and Public 
Policy: Bridging the Gap. Am. Behav. Sci. 44,168-187 
Rudolph, S. (2005): Handelbare Emissionslizenzen. Marburg: Metropolis 
Rudolph, S. (2009): How the German Patient Followed the Doctor’s Orders – Political Econ-
omy Lessons from Implementing Market-Based Instruments in Germany. In: Lye, L. H. et 43 
 
al. (eds.): Critical Issues in Environmental Taxation – International and Comparative Per-
spectives. Vol. VII. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 587-606 
Rudolph, S. et al. (2011): Towards Sustainable Carbon Markets: Requirements for Ecologi-
cally Effective, Economically Efficient, and Socially Just  Emissions Trading Schemes. 
MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics, No. 34-2011 
Schneider, F. and J. Volkert (1999), No chance for incentive orientated environmental poli-
cies in representative democracies, A Public Choice analysis, Ecological Economics 31/1, 
pp.123-138 
Schneider, F. and H. Weck-Hannemann, Why is economic theory ignored in environmental 
policy practice?, Applied Research Environmental Economics 31/3, pp.257-275, 
2005.Schreurs, Miranda A. (2002): Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany, and the 
United States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Schröder, H. (2003): Climate Change Policy in Japan. Berlin (PhD Thesis at the Otto-Suhr-
Institut for Political Sciences of the Free University of Berlin) 
Shimizu, J./Takahashi, S. (2009): Personal Interview with Sven Rudolph. Tokyo, March 31
st, 
2009 
Stavins, R. N., Keohane, and R. Revesz (1997). The Positive Political Economy of Instrument 
Choice in Environmental Policy. Discussion papers 97-25, Resources for the Future: 
Washington, DC, USA 
Stavins, R. N. (2003b). Market-based Environmental Policies. What Can We Learn from U.S. 
Experience (and Related Research)? Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper 03-43 
Sterk, W. et al. (2006): Ready to Link Up? Wuppertal (JETSET Working Paper I/106) 
Sugiyama, T. (2009): Personal Interview with Sven Rudolph. Tokyo, March 9th, 2009 
Svendsen, G. T. (2002). Lobbysm and CO2 trade in the EU. Presented at the 10
th Symposium 
of the Econ-Sohmen-Foundation in Dresden, Working Papers 02-16, University of Aarhus, 
Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics 
Takahashi, H./Nishimura, I. (2009): Personal Interview with Sven Rudolph. Tokyo, March 
31
st, 2009 
Tellier, G. (2006). Public expenditures in Canadian provinces: An empirical study of politico-
economic interactions. Public Choice 126, 367-385 
TEPCO (2010): 2020 Vision. Tokyo 
Thalmann, P. (2004). The public acceptance of green taxes: 2 million voters express their 
opinion. Public Choice 119, 179–217. 
Tietenberg, T. (2006): Emissions Trading. Washington D.C.: Resources for the Future 44 
 
Tietenberg, T. (2011): Environmental and Natural Resource Economics. Boston: Pearson-
Prentice Hall 
van der Bergh, J. C. (2009). Safe climate policy is affordable – 12 reasons. Clim. Chang. DOI 
10.1007/s10584-009-9719-7. 
Wakabayashi, M./Sugiyama, T. (2007): Japan’s Keidanren Voluntary Action Plan. In: Mor-
genstern, R. D./Pizer, W. A. (2007): Reality Check. Washington D. C.: Resources for the 
Future. 43-63 
Watanabe, R. (2011): Climate Policy Changes in Germany and Japan – A Path to Paradigmat-
ic Policy. London: Routledge 
Weck-Hannemann, H. (2008). Environmental Politics. In C. K. Rowley and F. Schneider 
(Ed.), Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy. Springer 
Weidner, H. (1992): Basiselemente einer erfolgreichen Umweltpolitik. Berlin: Sigma 
Wüstenhagen, R. and M. Bilharz (2006). Green energy market development in Germany: ef-
fective public policy and emerging customer demand. Energy Policy 34, 1681–1696. 
WWF Japan (2010): san‘in-sen 2010: kaku tou no manifesto 
Yamada, K. et al. (2009): Personal Interview with Sven Rudolph. Tokyo, April 1
st, 2009 
Yamagishi, N. (2009): Personal Interview with Sven Rudolph. Tokyo, March 2
nd, 2009 
Yamagishi, N. (2010): Personal Interview with Sven Rudolph. Tokyo, November 11
th, 2010 
Yin, R. K. (2009): Case Study Research – Design and Methods. Los Angeles: Sage 
Yoshida, A. (2009): Personal Interview with Sven Rudolph. Tokyo, February 26
th, 2009 